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THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. By Thomas J. Curry.' New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. viii, 276. Cloth, $28.00;
paper, $10.95.
Michael W. McConnel/2

Of the recent books on the history and meaning of the religion
clauses of the first amendment, this one stands out-for its objectivity, its clarity, and most of all its genuine usefulness in understanding the religion clauses. For the first seven of its eight chapters, The
First Freedoms is a historian's history, a readable and undogmatic
account of the controversies over religious freedom in each of the
thirteen colonies from their founding to the ratification of the Constitution. These episodes provide an indispensable background for
understanding the framers' work in 1789.
Only in the last chapter, on the drafting of the first amendment
itself, does Curry begin to encroach on lawyers' territory and adopt
some of the lawyers' vices. There he allows the agenda and the
terms of debate to be set by the controversies of today. There he
begins to lose the authentic voice of the historical struggle for religious freedom.
To understand the importance of the book, one must recognize
the peculiar nature of the modem debate over church-state relations
in the United States. That debate began with the famous dissents of
Justice Rutledge in Everson and Justice Reed in McCollum, during
the 1946 and 1947 Terms. Each based his opinion on the historical
origins of the religion clauses, but the two men reached quite different conclusions. Justice Rutledge concluded that the framers intended "to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively
forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion." Justice
Reed, on the other hand, stated the governing principle as follows:
"[t]he state cannot influence one toward religion against his will or
punish him for his beliefs."
Rutledge thus stood for separation, Reed for voluntarism. The
two interpretations, while pointing the same way in many cases,
1. Monsignor, Archdiocese of Los Angeles, Ph.D., History, Claremont Graduate
School.
2. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks are due the
John M. Olin Foundation for financial support during the preparation of this review, and my
colleague Larry Kramer for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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have quite different-even contradictory-implications. Not all
contacts between government and religion pose a threat to religious
choice, and an artificial divorcement can have the perverse effect of
eliminating religious choice within areas of life supported, regulated, or even touched by government.
The Supreme Court adopted Rutledge's essential position
(though from time to time it has recoiled from the practical consequences). So thorough was the intellectual victory that many
Americans now think that "separation of church and state" is the
constitutional command. Even some scholars have referred to the
establishment clause as the "separation clause. "3 The Supreme
Court's doctrine of "entanglement" is the doctrinal expression of
the Rutledge view.4
As time wore on, the debate took a mischievous turn. Opponents of separation began to argue that the establishment clause forbids only government recognition of a single church, or group of
churches. Thus, they contended that "nonpreferential" aid-allocated on a nondiscriminatory basis to all faiths-is constitutionally
permissible, even if it is coerced from unwilling nonbelievers and
unrelated to any of the secular purposes of government.s They supported this view with various statements from the framers to the
effect that "no particular sect or society ought to be favored or established by law"-and especially James Madison's explanation on
the floor of the House of Representatives that his proposed amendment was designed to allay fears that "one sect might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to
which they would compel others to conform."
The problem with the nonpreferentialist argument is not so
much that it is wrong (though it probably is wrong) but that it obscures the real issue. In the great religious controversies of twentieth century America, the ideal of separation has come into more
frequent conflict with the ideal of freedom than it did in an earlier
age of minimalist government. As the scope of government expands
into areas that formerly were private and often religious (such as
3. SeeP. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 17 (1962).
4. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971).
5. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); R. CoRD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982);
M. MALBJN, RELIGION AND PoLmCS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1978). An early version of the argument, written shortly after Everson and
McCollum, is J. O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CoNSTITUTION (1949).
For the opposing view, see L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE (1986); Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv.
875 (1986).

1989]

BOOK REVIEWS

125

education and social welfare), excluding religion from the governmental sphere becomes a powerful engine of secularization. Since
1840, government has become the principal source of funds for elementary and secondary education. Must that financial leverage be
used in ways that discourage religious choice in education? Since
the New Deal, numerous regulatory schemes have arisen to control
the activities of employers and businesses. Should these systems of
control be extended to the religious sphere? In recent decades, free
speech rights have been extended to public high school students.
Should an exception be made for religious speech? These are the
issues of today, and the nonpreferentialists' argument is of little
assistance in resolving them. Religion, as such, is not asking for
"aid," but only that it not be driven to the margins of public life.
Worse still, the nonpreferentialist argument has been used as a
justification for invasions of the religious freedom of those who do
not believe in the existence of a god or adhere to a religious faith.
With the field divided between advocates of separation and proponents of non preferential aid, the principle of voluntarism has had no
champion.
The First Freedoms not only provides the first serious historical
rebuttal to the nonpreferentialist argument,6 it casts doubt on
separationism as well. Curry observes that many of those at the
time of the founding who used seemingly nonpreferentialist language were "unmistakably opposed to proposals for non-discriminatory government assistance to religion," giving telling examples.
John Leland proposed an amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution that the state should never "establish any religion by law,
[or] give any one sect a preference to another," yet he was also one
of the most radical opponents of coerced (nonpreferential) support
for religion. One Massachusetts town, in the very course of denouncing the Commonwealth's system of nondiscriminatory aid,
stated that "no subordination of any one Sect or Denomination to
another shall ever be established by law." These examples, and
others, suggest that nonpreferentialist language should not always
be taken literally. "Eighteenth-century American history offers
abundant examples of writers using the concept of preference," observes Curry, "when, in fact, they were referring to a ban on all
government assistance to religion."
Nonetheless, Curry's account does not entirely invalidate the
6. Laycock, supra note 5, is a more thorough rebuttal, since it is devoted solely to the
task of refuting nonpreferentialism. Laycock acknowledges at the beginning of his article
that he relied on The First Freedoms as part of his own research. Laycock, supra note 5, at
875 n.3.
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nonpreferentialist thesis. He notes that several states (most notably
in New England) favored some form of mandatory support for religion, where individuals could choose which denomination to support. Substantial minorities in Virginia, Maryland, and possibly
South Carolina agreed. It is quite possible, on the evidence, that the
framers of the first amendment were sympathetic to this approach,
and did not intend to prohibit it. Curry's contrary argument is as
follows:
[A]lthough these states demanded that religion in general be supported, no evidence
sustains the viewpoint that in so doing they saw themselves as opting for a permissible, non-exclusive establishment. They never described themselves as designing an
establishment at all.

Of course they didn't describe their own system as an "establishment"; that was a term of opprobrium, which they reserved for
single establishments of the sort known in England and formerly
some of the colonies. The point is that they might not have understood the first amendment's use of the word "establishment" as inconsistent with a nondiscriminatory scheme of aid. This is the best
argument for reading the first amendment to keep open the nonpreferentialist alternative.
Curry makes the mistake of denigrating the best evidence for
his position: the particular wording adopted by the framers of the
religion clauses. Professor Laycock has argued that close attention
to the wording of the various drafts of the amendment strongly suggests that the nonpreferential view was considered and deliberately
rejected by its framers. 1 Curry, in contrast, assertss that the Senate
debate over the wording of the amendment should "be seen as a
discussion about style, not substance." He states that "[t]o examine
the two clauses of the amendment as a carefully worded analysis of
Church-State relations would be to overburden them." While he
may be correct, he weakens his own conclusion and makes close
study of the framing seem a bit useless.
While explicitly, if not conclusively, debunking the nonpreferentialist interpretation of the religion clauses, The First Freedoms
also demolishes-tacitly but thoroughly-the separationist reading.
7. Jd. at 879-85. For example, early in its deliberations the Senate adopted a draft
proposal that "Congress shall make no law establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others." It later adopted a still weaker version: "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship." These are "nonpreferentialist" alternatives.
The House of Representatives, however, refused to accede to the Senate's version, and insisted upon the establishment clause in its current form. This appears to reflect a deliberate
rejection of the nonpreferentialist view. See id. at 880-81.
8. Since there were no recorded debates, the argument on both sides is necessarily
speculative.
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In fascinating detail, Curry describes every important clash between
religious and civil authority from the founding of the colonies to the
adoption of the Constitution. Religion was a fertile source for controversy, and the ensuing arguments were varied and impressive.
Yet not once in that one hundred and sixty-year period was the
concept of "separation of church and state" invoked. Separation
was simply not the issue. Liberty of conscience-something akin to
Reed's voluntarism-was the issue.
When colonial governors attempted to interfere with the internal affairs of nonestablished churches-an obvious breach of "separation"-this was attacked as a violation of "liberty of conscience."
When Quakers were required to pay money for the support of Congregational ministers in Massachusetts, they did not complain of a
breach of "separation," of "aid to religion," or even of "establishment." They appealed to the colony's protections for "liberty of
conscience." When advocates and opponents of a general assessment for religious teachers squared off in Virginia, they too "concerned themselves with showing whether it violated or did not
violate freedom of religion." While some breaches of separation
(what we would now call establishment clause violations) were vigorously opposed, this was not on the basis of an abstract adherence
to separation, but on its practical implications for religious liberty.
To call the establishment clause the "separation clause" is evidently
an anachronism. Thomas Jefferson's metaphor of a "wall of separation" was not coined until the succeeding century. In The First
Freedoms, the term "separation" is the dog that did not bark. If
"separation of church and state" were the heart of the matter, one
would expect to see some mention of it in contemporary sources.
Curry makes no mention of the absence of evidence for the
separationist view (other than to comment in the preface that "the
term 'separation of Church and State' ... obscures rather than clarities the issue"). Yet for every nonpreferentialist on the bench or in
the academy, there have been two dozen separationists, loudly
claiming that their construction of the first amendment is rooted in
history. Given the obvious implication of the historical record, it is
difficult to understand why Curry attacks nonpreferentialism while
giving separationism a free ride.
The separationist interpretation of the establishment clause has
caused the principles of the two religion clauses to diverge, and even
to become inconsistent. The establishment clause is seen as prohibiting government "benefits" to religion, while the free exercise
clause is seen as requiring them (under certain circumstances).9
9.

See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict,
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The First Freedoms exposes the error of this view. The framers of
the first amendment did not set forth two mutually inconsistent
principles of church-state relations, nonestablishment and free exercise. Both were an outgrowth of the wider term, "liberty of
conscience."
As Curry states, "Contemporaries did not, for example, distinguish between religious oppression as falling under the ban of the
'free exercise' clause and a general assessment as being prohibited
by the 'establishment' clause." The two clauses represented a coordinated expression of the principle of voluntarism in religion-that
the government may neither force nor prohibit, encourage nor discourage, the practice of religion. An interpretation of the religion
clauses as in "tension" with one another should be rejected on historical, as well as logical, grounds. The establishment clause does
not conflict with the free exercise clause; the "conflict" is due to the
separationist interpretation of the clause.
Understandably but nonetheless unfortunately, Curry's inquiries have apparently been shaped by the historical debates in lawyers'
briefs. Ever since Everson and McCollum, legal commentators have
been preoccupied with the question: what is an "establishment of
religion"? The First Freedoms helpfully draws attention to the ways
the term "establishment" was used in the years preceding adoption
of the first amendment. For reasons that remain mysterious, however, neither lawyers nor judges nor academics have seen fit to ask
about the historical origins of the term "free exercise." Accordingly, Curry does little, at least directly, to elucidate this equally
important problem.
His chapter, "Liberty of Conscience in Eighteenth-Century
America," provides the attentive reader with much information to
assist in the task, with ample instances of the factual circumstances
that gave impetus to the concept of free exercise. Curry does not
remark the fact, but many of these disputes, including the demand
by religious dissenters for exemption from such general requirements as oath taking, military service, and tithing, in the name of
"liberty of conscience," lend support to the Supreme Court's modern doctrine of religion-specific exemptions under the free exercise
clause. In contrast to the "establishment" issue, however, the book
contains little direct discussion of the terminological point. There is
no discussion, for example, of the relation between the terms "liberty of conscience" and "free exercise of religion." Surprisingly,
The First Freedoms does not even discuss the most pertinent debate
41 U. PJTI. L. REV. 673, 677-78 (1980); McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP.

Cr. REV. 1, 1-2.

1989]

BOOK REVIEWS

129

on the matter: that between James Madison and George Mason
over the wording of Virginia's "free exercise" provision, adopted in
1776. Nor does the book attempt to draw any inferences from the
legislative history of the free exercise clause itself. Perhaps these
omissions are attributable to Curry's general reluctance to engage in
close analysis of the language of legal sources, which (as already
noted) weakens his presentation on the establishment clause as well.
Whatever the reason, this omission of a linguistic history of the
term "free exercise" contributes, presumably unintentionally, to the
establishment-centered orientation of the history and doctrine of
the religion clauses.
The First Freedoms also gives insufficient attention to the relation between the Bill of Rights and the allocation of power between
the federal government and the states. Since "incorporation" of the
religion clauses against the states through the fourteenth amendment, this issue has faded in practical importance, but it cannot be
ignored by a historian-not least because a failure to appreciate the
original concerns about states' rights makes the positions of the participants difficult to understand. The debates over the religion
clauses were as much about federalism as they were about religion.
The establishment clause was specifically designed to preserve state
prerogatives, including the prerogative to establish religion, against
federal encroachment. A "law respecting an establishment of religion" is a law establishing, disestablishing, or in any way subjecting
a state's religious establishment to federal control.w
Curry makes no effort to explain the "respecting" language, or
to place it in the context of the federalism debate. His sole recognition of the federalism aspect of the problem is to assert, unconvincingly, that Anti-federalists Patrick Henry and Elbridge Gerry, both
supporters of a form of establishment in their respective states,
could not have favored a "narrow" interpretation of the establishment clause at the federal level, since they wanted to minimize the
authority of the central government, and that for Madison to support a "narrow" interpretation would be an "inexplicable about
tum," since it would "allow the federal government power over religion that he would not grant his own state."
These matters are certainly complicated, but Curry's off-hand
accusation of inconsistency is far from ineluctable. Henry and
Gerry had political, as well as ideological, motivations to criticize
10. W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 9 (1964); see C. ANTIEAU,
A. DoWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL EsTABLISHMENT: FORMATION
AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES (1964); Van Alstyne,
What Is "An Establishment of Religion"?, 65 N.C.L. REv. 909 (1987).
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Madison's handiwork, and in any event a narrow interpretation of
"establishment" perfectly accords with the understanding of the
meaning of the word they displayed in their own states' debates.
Madison, for his part, believed that the threat of factions (for which
his paradigm was the religious sect) was far more serious at the
state than at the federal level; thus it made perfect sense for him to
insist on more stringent constitutional restrictions at the state than
the federal level. 11 This does not prove, of course, that either
Madison or the Anti-federalists favored a "narrow" interpretation,
but only that Curry's account of the federalism aspect of the controversy is too facile.
The main value of The First Freedoms is not its analysis of legal
documents-statutes, constitutional provisions, legislative debates.
Curry is far too quick to dismiss arguments based on the language
of these sources as "literalism." The book's great contribution is
the seven chapters describing the actual church-state controversies
that inspired the state and federal constitutional protections for religious liberty. These controversies place the religion clauses in a far
different light than the popular conception based on Rutledge's dissent in Everson. The religion clauses were not born in an Enlightenment spirit of secular distrust of the influence of religion on public
life. Far from it. As The First Freedoms demonstrates, they were
born primarily of the efforts of intensely religious people (Quakers,
Presbyterians, above all Baptists) to free themselves from the
shackles of state interference and control. The religion clauses were
not intended to be a force for secularization of American life. They
were intended to create a regime of liberty in which each religious
group could "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the
appeal of its dogma."l2 The First Freedoms is an important reminder of why we have a first amendment.
II. See McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
1484, 1505-06 (1987).
12. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S 306, 313 (1952).
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